The paper explains that the Russian gas giant, Gazprom, has failed to invest adequately, resulting in very little development of new gas supplies in Russia. The result has been progressively increasing use by Gazprom of central Asian gas supplies, at progressively higher prices for Russia. The increased prices of gas for Russian consumers have shown that it is crucial for Russian welfare to allow new entrants, and to introduce competition in the Russian domestic market. Competition among multiple gas suppliers from Russia, however, would erode or eliminate the monopoly profits of the Russian Federation on gas exports. Thus, with a more competitive domestic market, the Russian government would be expected to grant exclusive exporting rights to a single entity (as it presently does with Gazprom) or impose export taxes. Thus, Europe should not expect to achieve cheaper Russian gas as a result of structural reforms within the Russian gas market. More promising avenues for European energy diversification are new pipeline construction to open up new sources of supply independent of Russia (especially the Nabucco pipeline) and liquefied natural gas purchases.
I. Introduction
During the negotiations between the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation on Russia's bilateral market access agreement with the EU for accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the EU pressed Russia to charge the same price for the exports of its natural gas as it charges in its domestic industrial consumers. The Russian Federation grants an export monopoly to Gazprom, allowing Gazprom to charge profit maximizing prices on its exports. The domestic price of natural gas, however, is regulated by the Russian Federation, resulting in dual pricing of natural gas, where export prices have far exceeded domestic prices in Russia. This issue was bitterly controversial in Russia, and then President Vladimir Putin declared that Russia would not join the WTO if forced to unify its gas prices. In a paper that reportedly was highly influential in resolving this dispute, Peter Thomson and I (Tarr and Thomson, 2004) , concluded that it was in Russia's interest to exploit its monopoly power on gas sales in Europe-this implies that dual pricing of natural gas was in Russia's interest. We estimated Russia gained substantially from dual pricing-by about two percent per year of its GDP.
As part of its strategy to diversify its energy sources, the European Union has sought competition in the Russian natural gas market. This has also been a long standing recommendation of the World Bank. 1 Due to the very low level of investment by Gazprom and resulting lack of development of new gas supplies, the introduction of competition in the Russian market has become even more crucial during the past decade.
Due to lack of supplies, Gazprom is relying increasingly on purchases of central Asian gas supplies, at ever increasing prices. Ironically, after winning its bitter battle for the right to impose dual pricing of natural gas, the Russian Federation has announced plans to raise prices to its domestic industrial users to European levels in 2011, less transportation costs and export taxes.
Competition among multiple gas suppliers from Russia would erode or eliminate the monopoly profits of the Russian Federation on gas exports. Thus, if competition were introduced, the Russian government would be expected to grant exclusive exporting 1 See, e.g., Tarr and Thomson (2004) 
II. Optimal Export Prices
Russia's proved natural gas reserves at the end of 2008 were 43.3 trillion cubic meters, which constitute 23.4 percent of the world's proven reserves. 3 Its 2008 production of 602 billion cubic meters (BCM) constituted 19.6 percent of world production. Its reserves to production ratio in 2008 of 72 years, is higher than any other significant producer except Saudi Arabia. Russia is also by far the world's largest It is in Russia's interest to try to maximize its profits from exports of natural gas.
Given the need to ship natural gas from Russia to Europe through a pipeline, Russia is able to "segment" the European market from the Russian market, and competes in Europe only with pipeline supplied gas subject to an upper limit on its price equal to the price of delivered liquefied natural gas. The Russian government has given Gazprom exclusive right to use the pipelines for the export of natural gas to Europe. 4 Given its market share, this implies Gazprom has some market power in Europe .5 Russian domestic consumption in 2008 of 420 BCM was 2.7 times Russia's sales in Europe. The key point is that to sell significantly more of its gas in Europe, Gazprom would have to accept a lower price, i.e., it faces a downward sloping demand curve. This means that there is no "world price" of gas that Russia faces. In this situation, it is optimal for Gazprom to set marginal revenue equal to marginal costs on exports to exploit this market power, which implies its price will exceed its long run marginal costs. Tarr and Thomson (2003) estimated that uniform pricing of Russian natural gas would be extremely costly to Russia. 6 If Gazprom were to sell its gas in Europe at long run marginal costs (including transportation costs), its lost profits would equal about two percent of Russian GDP.
III. Russia's Domestic Gas Market
Gazprom had a virtual monopoly on domestic gas sales for many years after independence, but the price of gas sales in Russia is regulated by the Federal Tariff Service of the Russian Federation. Moreover, Gazprom controls the gas pipeline within Russia. Legally, "Third Party Access" to the pipelines is granted in Russian law to Russia's independent gas producers (who are both vertically integrated oil companies and imported about 7-9 BCM in 2008. The other principal suppliers of gas to the European market are Algeria (through a pipeline across the Mediterranean), Norway, the Netherlands and the UK. See British Petroleum (2009) 6 Although the data have changed since 2001, the principles remain the same. In 2001, Gazprom sold its gas in Europe at between $79 and $99 per thousand cubic meters plus $27 transportation costs. Gazprom president Alexei Miller reported on March 14, 2008 that "the price [of Russian gas] in Europe now exceeds $370. We believe the average price in 2008 could be $378 and could even reach $400 per 1,000 cubic meters." Regarding demand in Russia, he noted that the rise of national industries, such as producers of cement, building materials, and fertilizers and gas refineries, is also pushing up Russian gas demands. Miller said that Gazprom plans to introduce market gas prices for Russian industrial consumers in 2011. See Johnson's Russia List, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-56-39.cfm.
In 2009, however, the price collapsed to an estimated $280 for 2009. Moreover, Gazprom in its zeal to control natural gas sales to Europe, entered into long term contracts with central Asian suppliers Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Gazprom reportedly is paying $340 per thousand cubic meters to Uzbekistan in 2009. But in 2009, due to a decline in world demand, Gazprom has been forced to close down its own wells that produce gas at much lower costs than it pays to central Asian suppliers. Gazprom has acknowledged losses on central Asian purchases in 2009, but argues they will be profitable contracts in the long term. Russia fought a bitter battle at the WTO and won the right to have dual pricing of natural gas. However, except for the 30 percent export tax difference and the transportation fees, Russian announced plans call for it to unify natural gas prices for its industrial users. 7 See Baranov ( 2008) and "Deputy Prime Minister Instructs Gazprom to Ease Pipeline Access for Russian Gas Producers," Global Insight, July 7, 2008. www.globalinsight.com/SDA/SDADetail13190.htm. 8 The largest independent seller of natural gas in Russia is the specialized gas company Novatek, followed by Rosneft. Other important independent sellers are Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz, TNK-BP and the Itera Group. See "Gazprom is Not the Only Player in the Russian Fields," Oil and Gas-Eurasia. August 2008. http://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/articles/p/80/articles/684
IV. Restructuring of the Natural Gas Industry in Russia
Why is Russia planning to allow domestic prices of natural gas to rise to such high apparently inefficient levels? Two insiders, Nemtsov and Milov (2008) , have argued that Gazprom is an inefficient company and that Russian consumers and taxpayers are being forced to pay for that inefficiency. As Russia's existing gas fields are being exhausted, a significant portion of the newer discoveries are available in more difficult places that require greater investment costs. The World Bank (2010) The Russian domestic market would be best served if Russia were to fully introduce competition. Competition in Russian gas would be best accomplished by breaking up the production and distribution segments of Gazprom into separate independent companies and effectively enforce third party access to the pipelines. The pipelines could be operated as regulated monopolies. Licenses that Gazprom has failed to use to develop gas fields under the terms of the licenses could be provided to independent companies. This would result in significant additional production, and competition among the producers will hold down the costs of natural gas in Russia.
If the additional Russian producers were allowed to export natural gas, competition among Russian firms would erode Russian monopoly profits on European sales. That is, unconstrained access to export markets would result in unified pricing through structural reform of the Russian market. In the absence of the Gazprom 6 monopoly, however, in order to extract the available monopoly profits on its exports of gas to Europe, it would be in Russia's interest to impose export taxes on Russian gas exporters or to use a state trading monopoly as a marketing arm of Russian natural gas exports. Compared with the Gazprom monopoly, such a system would result in higher profits for Russia as a whole, since gas would then come from the most efficient Russian supplier.
V. Energy Diversification for Europe

Diversification of Russian Supplies
If additional Russian producers were allowed to compete and export natural gas, in order to extract the available monopoly profits on its exports of gas to Europe, 10 it would be in Russia's interest to impose export taxes on Russian gas exporters or to use a state trading monopoly as a marketing arm of Russian natural gas exports. A more From Russia's perspective, the idea is to by-pass Ukraine and Turkey, but the existing pipeline through Ukraine transports 130 BCM, so Ukraine will retain its dominant position. Moreover, maritime rights with either Urkaine or Turkey will have to be agreed, thereby negating a least part of the key advantage of this project from Russia's perspective.
Nabucco. The Nabucco pipeline is a planned natural gas pipeline from Erzurum, Turkey through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary to a major natural gas hub at Baumgarten an der March, Austria. It is a partnership of five companies, with one company from each of the five countries through which the pipeline runs. Construction is expected to begin in 2010 and be completed in 2014. It is a significant part of the European strategy for diversification of energy sources. The initial source of natural gas for the pipeline would be gas from Azerbaijan through existing pipelines that link Azerbaijan gas to Turkey.
There are estimates, however, that Azeri gas supplies are inadequate to justify construction of the pipeline, so additional supplies are sought. Turkmenistan is expected to feed the pipeline also, either through pipelines in Iran or through the proposed complicated Trans-Caspian pipeline across the Caspian Sea. If the Trans-Caspian pipeline were constructed, Kazakhstan could also become a supplier to the pipeline.
Egypt and Iraq could supply the pipeline through the Arab Gas Pipeline. Finally, Iran
